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OBSERVATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC
REGULATIONS OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD
By JON MAGNUSSON
Attorney, Public Housing Administration; University of Virginia,
B.S., 1935; George Washington University, LL.B., 1937; Member,
District of Columbia and Virginia Bars. Formerly, General Coun-
sel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board; Special Attorney, House Com-
mittee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.
T HE Civil Aeronautics Board's Economic Regulations are the sub-
stantive rules that command certain conduct in connection with
the operation of the business affairs of all air carriers which are subject
to the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended.' The
Economic Regulations are distinct from the Board's rules of procedure
which describe the steps that must be followed in the conduct of busi-
ness before the Board, its examiners or its staff.2 Violations of the
Economic Regulations can be punished under the Act, and the courts
can enforce these rules on the request of aggrieved parties or of the
Board itself.3 To this extent they are extensions of the Act.4 The
Constitutionality of such extensions by regulation is well established.5
These regulatory extensions of the Act should stem from specific
delegations of power to promulgate them. In promulgating Economic
Regulations, however, the Board has not sought for definite sources of
authority nor has it distinguished between legislation and interpreta-
tion. Even though the necessary objectives now reached by loosely
derived Economic Regulations could have been achieved through
specific authorizations in the Act, the Board has chosen to develop its
Economic Regulations from general authorization. As a result the
Board's Economic Regulations are productive of difficulties of under-
I Act of June 23, 1938, 52 Stat. 973; as amended by various Acts.
2 Until July 1, 1949 Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings were an inte-
gral part of the Economic Regulations and appeared therein as Part 285 as
"Rules of Practice." They are now known as Procedural Regulations and are di-
vided into two parts: "Rules of Practice in Safety Proceedings" and "Rules of
Practice in Economic Proceedings." "Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings"
are contained in Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter 1, Subchapter C,
Part 302.
3 Trans-Pacific Airlines v. Hawaiian Airlines, 174 F. (2d) 63 (1949) ; C.A.B.
v. Modern Air Transport, 81 F. Supp. 803 (1949), and American Airlines v.
Standard Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 135 (1948).
4 Columbia Broadcasting System v. U.S., 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Standard Oil
Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942); C. V. Starr & Co. v. Commissioner, 101 Fed.
(2d) (C.C.A. 4th 1939).
5 Norwegian Nitrogen Products v. U.S., 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933) ; Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892).
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standing, uncertainty as to required conduct and costly challenges to
the Board's authority.
THE BOARD'S CHOICE OF AUTHORITY FOR ECONOMIC REGULATIONS
According to the Civil Aeronautics Board,
"Basic responsibility and power with respect to the regulation
of the economic aspects of air transportation are conferred upon
the Board by Section 205 and the various provisions of Title IV of
the Civil Aeronautics Act." 6
In this statement the Board recognizes that specific regulations cannot
be adopted and imposed upon those subject to the Board's jurisdiction
by virtue of Sec. 205 alone. Sec. 205 (a) confers general rule-making
power in the following terms:
"The Authority is empowered . . . to make and amend such gen-
eral or special rules, regulations, and procedure pursuant to and
consistent with the provisions of this Act, as it shall deem neces-
sary to carry out such provisions and to exercise and perform its
powers and duties under the Act."
Specific rules derive validity from individual authorizations set forth
in Title IV.7 Sec. 205 (a) in itself is so general that it would seem to
involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers for want
of sufficiently specific standards." This section acquires precise mean-
ing only in connection with particular directives as to the subjects on
which regulations should be issued pursuant to the ActY The par-
ticular directives in Title IV point out the specific interstices which
Congress wants filled in by administrative regulation. The Board, it
should be noted, does not hold that such particularity is necessary.
Title IV of the Act, plus its derivative Economic Regulations issued
pursuant to the general authority of Sec. 205, constitute, ideally, a
complete statement of all the rules necessary to guide an air carrier
on economic matters subject to Federal regulation. As conceived by
the Board, however, the purpose of the printed regulations is limited
to supplementing the Act. Its Economic Regulations presently provide
only certain rules in addition to those now implicit in the Act, or as it
may be amplified by Board decisions. The Ac't plus the regulations
as well as, in some instances, relevant Board decisions, must be read
together to determine required conduct. Thus the regulations have
6 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1949, p. 18.
7 Avent v. U.S., 266 U.S. 127 (1924); U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911);
Titsworth v. Commissioner, 73 Fed. (2d) 385 (CCA 3d 1934).
8 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414
(1944); Schecter Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).; Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ; MeCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat. 316, 412 (1819).
9 Hampton Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
10 This has been accomplished in the note accompanying Part 291 as an inter-
pretation thereof. Examples of "regular" and "irregular" service are given in
interpretation of the prohibition against scheduled air flights. This is a very use-
ful and commendable innovation in the Regulations.
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the limited objective of stating only a few policy conclusions arising
in the furtherance of the Act's requirements with regard to future
conduct not specifically dealt with elsewhere. The Board's Economic
Regulations could, of course, include both the provisions of the Act
and its implementing rules together with any interpretations of gen-
eral applicability. 0° This would provide a much more useful tool for
the regulated industry than the present partial statement which re-
quires recourse to the two main sources.
The Board's publication of Economic Regulations is a partial
statement of the power it has exercised. What the Board can put in
its Economic Regulations depends upon its authority to make rules.
What it wants to put in them depends upon the needs that have been
demonstrated to the Board as requiring some regulatory guidance
which it is authorized to provide.
Within Title IV Congress has stated the subjects proper to the
supplemental regulation of air carriers.. Its sixteen sections may be
divided into three types of provisions insofar as the authority of the
Board to make specific regulations is concerned. First are those pro-
visions which directly authorize or require the Board to make imple-
menting regulations." Second are those provisions which regulate
air carriers in general terms, without stating in so many words that the
Board shall implement them by regulation, but which require some
directive by the Board to make them effective.' 2 Third are those pro-
visions which are so specific as to require no further substantive regula-
tion to make them effective. 13  Little difficulty is encountered in
determining the legal status of the third category: these are self-execut-
ing rules of conduct that can be complied with in accordance with
their obvious intent. The first and second categories, however, require
some sort of implementing action to impose their penalties or to make
their meaning clear to those whose conduct is to be guided by the
statutory requirements.14
It has been contended that different rule-making action must be
taken with respect to the first and second categories, and that different
sanctions may be imposed with regard to a violation of a regulation
11 E.g., Sec. 401(b) : "Application for a certificate . . . shall be accompanied
by such proof of service upon such interested persons, as the Authority shall by
regulations require." Equally specific directives are found in Sees. 401(f) and(k), 402(d) and (e), 403(a), (b) and (c), and. 405(e) and (m).
12E.g., Sees. 401(g), 402(f), 403 (d), 405(f), 406(a) and (b), 407(a), (b),(c) and (d), 410, and 416(a) and (b).
13 E.g., Sec. 401(a) prohibiting any carrier from engaging in air transporta-
tion unless the Board has issued a certificate authorizing such transportation.
Also: Sees. 401(c), (d), (e), (h), (i), (j),(l), (m) and (n), 402(a), (b), (c),
(g) and (h), 403, 404(a), (b) and (e), 405(a),(b) and (c), 406(c), (d), (e) and(f), 407(e), 408(a), (b), (c), (d) and(e), 409(a) and (b), 411, 412(a) and (b),
413, 414 and 415.
14 Federal Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill et al., 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Colum-
bia Broadcasting System v. U.S., supra.
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depending on the authorization behind the action.' 5 The specific rule-
making provisions of the first category are said to confer true legisla-
tive power, while any regulations made pursuant to a less specific di-
rective are interpretative only. The Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure in its Report 16 recognizes a distinction be-
tween interpretations and substantive regulations as follows:
"3. Interpretations.-Most agencies find it useful from time to
time to issue interpretations of the statutes under which they oper-
ate. These interpretations are ordinarily of an advisory character,
indicating merely the agency's present belief concerning the mean-
ing of applicable statutory language. They are not binding upon
those affected, for if there is disagreement with the agency's view,
the question may be presented for determination by a court...
"4. Substantive regulations.-Many statutes contain provisions
which become fully operative only after exercise of an agency's
rule-making function. Sometimes the enjoyment of a privilege is
made conditional upon regulations, as, for example, where Congress
permits the importation of an article upon such rules and regula-
tions as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe ... In such in-
stances the striking characteristic of the legislation is that it
attaches sanctions to compel observance of the regulations, by
imposing penalties upon or withholding benefits from those who
disregard their terms. Thus these substantive regulations have
many of the attributes of statutes themselves and are well described
as subordinate legislation."
It is thus contended that the significance of regulations differs with the
authorizing language of the law. The compilers of the regulations pub-
lished in the Federal Register recognize this contention to some extent
in their statement of the authority for published regulations appear-
ing in the Code of Federal Regulations.' 7
So far as the Board's own actions are concerned, however, there
is no distinction by separate sets of regulations or other distinguishing
labels between the two types or of the authority relied upon in promul-
gating any particular regulation.1" The Economic Regulations con-
tain both types without distinction.
15 Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, Elsworth C. Alvord, 40
Columbia L. Rev. 252; Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (CCA 2d 1937), cert. de-
nied, 302 U.S. 756 (1937); Walker v. U.S., 83 F. (2d) 103 (CCA 8th 1936) ; Hel-
vering v. Safe Deposit Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F. (2d) 806 (CCA 4th 1938).
16 Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 27.
17 A typical statement is at the head of Part 201 of the Economic Regula-
tions: "Authority: §§201.1 to 201.5 issued under Sec. 205(a); 52 Stat. 984, 49
U.S.C. 425. Interprets or applies Sec. 401, 52 Stat. 987, 49 U.S.C. 481?' The dis-
tinction is apparently made between "interprets" and "applies," the former clari-
fying existing meaning and the latter providing true supplementing legislation.
1s Cf. the regulations of the Wages and Hours Administrator: C.F.R., Tit. 29.
Chapter V has two subehapters. Subchapter A is titled "Regulations"; Subchap-
ter B is "Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Not Directly Related to
Regulations." It is declared to "clarify ... the practices and policies which will
guide the administration and enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act."
The introductory statement also says that before the' Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947
interpretations were "only advisory, so far as the rights and liabilities of employ-
ers and employees were concerned, because the courts alone had the authority to
make legally binding interpretations." The Administrator also issues "orders"
which are in format like regulations, but are addressed to specific industries or
trades.
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There is some support for the Board's position. It has been held
that there is no fundamental distinction between interpretation and
legislation in the work of an administrative agency.19 This proposition
can be demonstrated logically and by analogy with precedent pertain-
ing to the powers Congress derives from the Constitution. 20 But it is
not so clear in the Board's case, because of what appears to be a spe-
cific legislative intent on the part of Congress to limit legislative type
rule-making powers to those situations in which the formulation of a
regulation has been specifically indicated. The legislative history of
the Act does not make this explicit. The language of the Act itself,
however, contains specific statements directing or permitting the
promulgation of a regulation in some cases as distinguished from other
specific directives in the Act which lack such a mandate. Different
types of regulatory action, with differing legal consequences, would
appear to be called for. The Act is fairly specific as to the ends to be
achieved by regulation and by order and as to the means to be used
by the Board. Little is left to implication. A complete job of legis-
lative regulation can be accomplished within the words of the Act,
as augmented by regulations on the subjects concerning which rule-
making has been specified, and by interpretation of order as to the
residue.
Such an interpretation of the sources of regulatory power would not
permit the Board to perform some actions which derive from a less
literal interpretation; but it is arguable whether any such actions
would further the authorized purposes of the Act. Whatever the
merits of the argument for a strict interpretation, the Board has in
fact accepted a "liberal" interpretation of its rule-making authority.
It has adopted regulations deriving authority from sections of the Act
having no specific regulations-directing language.
For example, Parts 251 -Prohibited Interests, Interlocking Rela-
tionships and 261 -Filing of Agreements rely on Sections 409 and 412
respectively for authority. Neither section requires any action subject
to such rules or regulations as the Board may prescribe or says anything
about implementing regulations. Section 409 prohibits certain inter-
company relationships by its officers or directors. Section 412 (a)
requires the filing of certain specified types of agreements. Section
412 (b) requires the Board to disapprove by order those agreements
that are "adverse to the public interest or in violation of the Act."
The regulations in these Parts undoubtedly provide useful tools for
carrying out the Board's responsibilities, but they are neither an inter-
pretation nor a rule of action implementing the Act. Part 251 estab-
lishes a procedure for obtaining approval of a prohibited relationship:
it does not prohibit or prescribe conduct as a true economic regulation
does. Its objectives can be accomplished by resort to authority under
19 Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, Hans J. Morgenthau,
28 Iowa L. Rev. 575.
20 McCulloch v. Maryland, supra.
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Section 407. Part 261 stems from Section 412 (a) which is so specific
as to be self-executing. If details regarding the method of filing con-
tracts are required, either a procedural regulation or informal instruc-
tions regarding the form and manner of filing the required contracts
would be appopriate.
In adopting regulations without specific authority or in misplacing
its requirements in the Economic Regulations, the Board has possibly
assumed (1) that some regulation was essential, (2) that the regula-
tion was germane to the general objectives of the Act, (3) that fine
distinctions were not its function and/or (4) that if any regulated
person did not like the regulation he could present the matter to a
court in a challenge of the Board's authority.2'
Not only the Board but the courts seem to be opposed to the strict
interpretation suggested here. The courts have held that an express
grant of power to make rules in several instances and the lack of such
grant in other instances is not conclusive proof of the intention to
withhold power to make rules unless there is a clear legislative intent
to preclude regulations.22 This does not close the door on the matter
because a clear legislative intent to preclude can be inferred in this
case. It is doubtful that the present Supreme Court would so find,
however. In the N. B. C. case it has stated:
"True enough the Act [Communications Act of 1934] does not
explicitly say that the Commission shall have power to deal with
network practices found inimical to the public interest. But Con-
gress was acting in a field that was both new and dynamic . . . In
the context of the developing problems to which it was directed, the
Act gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive powers." 23
The same court could say the same thing about aeronautics under
the Act. Mr. Justice Frankfurter could say of the strict interpretation
argument, as he said in the N. B. C. case, that Congress would have
frustrated
"... the purpose for which the Communications Act of 1934 was
brought into being by attempting an itemized catalogue of specific
manifestations of general problems for the solution of which it was
establishing a regulatory agency. That would have stereotyped the
powers of the Commission to specific details in regulating a field of
enterprise the dominant characteristic of which is the dominant
pace of its unfolding."
This is heady talk: Congressional action as "specific manifestations
of general problems" and an industry with a "dominant pace" to "its
21 See: Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
'2 This seems contrary to the general rule of statutory construction that
where a statute expressly states the situations where a regulation may be promul-
gated, it thereby negates authority to make regulations in situations not expressly
mentioned. See: 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 244; and 59 C. J. Statutes for refer-
ences to the application of the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" in
statutory interpretation.
'3 N.B.C. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ; also C.A.B. v. State Airlines, 338 U.S.
574, p. 576 (1950) ; American Airline v. C.A.B., 178 F. (2d) 903 (1949).
ECONOMIC REGULATIONS OF CAB
unfolding." These are tough things to be accused of frustrating and
no Congressmen want to be accused of stereotyping. The loose-con-
structionist approach would appear to be the "dominant" one; and
the Board, with apparent Supreme Court encouragement, is well
within the limits of sound discretion in acting accordingly with regard
to its rule-making powers under the Act.
It can therefore be safely assumed that, with respect to future regu-
latory activity, the Board will not be governed by strict rules of
relevance as to its authority to put out legislative regulations. The
Board will feel free to issue regulations on any subject that is in any
Way related to the subjects covered by the Act. "Implied" powers will
be relied upon.
This is the basis upon which regulations are prepared and explains,
no doubt, such regulations as Part 224 which compels air carriers to
carry personnel without charge when they are "acquainting" them-
selves "with problems affecting air traffic control." This is also the
basis for Parts 290 through 296 .which extends exemptions to specified
air carriers from certain sections of the Act and regulations on condi-
tion that an elaborate scheme of rules is followed. These exemptions
"on condition" are in effect a whole subsidiary set of regulations
which have no status whatever under any specific terms of the Act.
It is not meant to imply by the foregoing that the broad objectives
sought by the Board cannot be accomplished or are to be frustrated by
a strict rule of relevance in interpreting authority. Other means than
an Economic Regulation are available, and Economic Regulations
deriving from other sections of Title IV may be more appropriate in
some cases. It is contended that the Board has a responsibility to rely
on specific authorizations and to avoid vague and tenuous allocations
of authority. The latter result in time-consuming and costly disputa-
tion both in the courts and before the Board and its examiners. A
policy of following close rules of relevance will produce less litigation,
a more solid basis of law observance requiring less enforcement activity
and a more lucid and coherent set of regulations would lead to easier
enforcement. Purely as a technical and practical matter, the present
haphazard formulation and location of Economic Regulations, or what
are in effect Economic Regulations, results in unnecessary difficulties
for both the Board's staff and the air carriers. The importance of a
sound policy regarding the formulation of Economic Regulations is
obvious when it is considered that each regulation-either through the
imposition of direct costs on airlines or through the limitations of their
opportunities for gain-can strike directly at the financial position of
an air carrier. Each regulation can create an increased need for pub-
lic subsidy.
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POTENTIALITIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AND
INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENTS
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be
performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future." 24
A comparison of the amount of space taken up by the Board's regula-
tions with that of its case reports, of the time spent by the Board on
the consideration and adoption of regulations with that spent on deci-
sions, and the number of personnel devoting full time to the study and
preparation of Regulations (one attorney) with those engaged in
individual case work would not lead to the conclusion that the Court's
advice was being followed by the Board.
There is a great need for regulations among the regulated members
of the industry as against decision by case adjudications. An eloquent
statement of this need by a practitioner in the communications field
has been made as follows:
"The trouble with federal administrative tribunals .... as I see,
is not with the procedure used in adopting regulations but rather
that the legislative method of making law is not used enough.
They rely too heavily on the slow, cumbersome and uncertain judi-
cial method, the so-called gradual process of 'inclusion and exclu-
sion' from case to case, in arriving at principles, in a word, in
arriving at more definite sub-standards of a vague statutory stand-
ard such as 'public interest, convenience or necessity' ...
"It is precisely by the legislative method that a body of experts
working in a specialized field can make the greatest contribution to-
ward 'filling in the gaps' of the legislative policy (or lack thereof)
fixed by Congress. Dealing intensively and continuously in a nar-
row field they learn (or should learn) rapidly what rules of conduct
are needed ... Why is it that administrative agencies are so back-
ward about exercising these powers? Why do some of them shy
away from an attempt to work out definite rules in advance, so that
the citizen may be advised of his rights and duties and all citizens
may be treated uniformly? Why do they insist, to so large extent,
on importing all the excess baggage of the common law case method
from the courts? I fear that in part at least the reason is that the
case method involves less day-by-day effort and postpones the occa-
sion when Beowulf must grapple with the monster of fundamental
principles." 25
The extent to which the Board provides guiding rules is a matter
within the discretion of the Board. It can respond to facts shown to
exist or to facts it observes and experiences. Equally, it can ignore
them until they indicate urgent problems. The facts can be presented
to it by interested persons in a formal hearing. In such a case the
speed of its response and the thoroughness with which it acts are
24 S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
25 Federal Communications Procedure, Louis G. Caldwell, 7 George Washing-
ton L. Rev. 740, pp. 757-758.
ECONOMIC REGULATIONS OF CAB
matters over which it has complete control and discretion. They are
qualitative matters and no legal responsibility to act in a prescribed
way (within the ambit of existing authority) can be shown nor do
parties have any rights to the promulgation of a specific type of
regulation.
Present procedure necessarily results in considerably less than a
comprehensive coverage of the field. Up until recently, for example,
the Board had not issued any regulations governing charter and special
services and it is doubted if anyone had a right to a regulation on the
subject regardless of the confusion such a failure to act may have
created. 26 It is recognized that there are strong pulls away from con-
trolling by regulations. In my opinion the Board can legally refrain
from issuing any regulation, or issue only meagre regulations to imple-
ment the Act.
In effect, formal Economic Regulations are avoided by case-by-case
regulation by the Board itself or by staff give and take in correspond-
ence and conferences with representatives of the air carriers. Where
there are a variety of circumstances to be dealt with which can not be
perceived in advance this is desirable and necessary. This is invariably
the case where the problems are new, and the methods used by the
airline industry new and changing. Its problems were at one time vary-
ing and specialized in nature. Future problems could not be forseen
nor could their nature be gauged accurately by the Board or the indus-
try. In the absence of experience or necessary foresight the ,case-by-case
method is a legitimate way of crystallizing tentative judgments into
rules.
These pressures away from the use of regulations, notwithstanding,
it is believed that there are compelling reasons of public interest, if not
of law, which impose a responsibility to resort to a more intensive
use of regulations and specific interpretations for defining conduct. A
statement, attributed to Charles Evans Hughes, fortifies this conclusion:
"The greatest assurance against an unsound rule of law is a
machinery by which its nature is made known and whereby any
departure from its uniform enforcement will be revealed to public
gaze. This is provided to a considerable degree by the legislative
method, and is not provided by the case-to-case method. The latter
permits the agency to avoid stating the principle which it is really
applying and to conceal discriminations in the verbiage of findings
and conclusions of fact."
The purpose of a regulation or an interpretative statement is to
inform the industry in detail as to the conduct the Board expects it to
follow in those cases in which regulations are authorized. A regulation
26 A regulation was proposed January 18, 1950, 15 F.R. 298, by Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, Draft Release No. 42, and February 15, 1950, 15 F.R. 827,
Draft Release No. 42-A. A regulation on this subject has recently been adopted
as Part 207 of the Economic Regulations, 16 F.R. 2700, March 28, 1951. Over a
year elapsed before action was taken on the draft proposal. The authorization to
regulate the subject has been in the Act since 1938.
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is a quick method of discharging such a responsibility with equality of
treatment to all persons in the same situation. The cumbersome and
uncertain case-to-case judicial method of arriving at principles is not a
satisfactory way of meeting a responsibility to solve such problems as,
for example, informing the industry of conditions of public interest
which justify an authorization for a temporary suspension of service
or for a change in tariffs on less than the required number of days'
notice. A decision and an order do not advise each and every member
of the industry in advance of his right and duties, and he is not assured
equal treatment with his competitors. The judicial method only in-
forms the participants in the case.
The so-called irregular air carriers, for example, until recently had
to go to the Page Airways Inc. Investigation decision and to the In-
vestigation of Nonscheduled Air Services decisions 27 in order to
determine some of their duties. From these decisions they had to
abstract general principles as announced in connection with the facts
in those cases and apply them to their own situation. Is it diny wonder
that they have, in the past, been uncertain - as they professed to be -
as to their duties; and, having a lot of money tied up in their venture,
that they gave themselves the benefit of any doubts in applying a
general principle to themselves? Temporary success with this procedure
led them to invest more, they continued with no clear interpretation
of the Act to guide them, until now the activities of some of them ap-
pear to be nothing but transportation bootlegging.
The feeder line operator is another party who may be bedevilled
by uncertainty as to the law applicable to him. A feeder is generally
one whose certificate has a duration of three years and requires stops
at all points named therein.28 Uncertainty exists both as to the time
and manner of renewal of such certificates - obviously a matter of some
importance to those having an investment in equipment and having
management responsibilities for such a line. An applicant for a route
knows he is only being given a three year life when a decision is ren-
dered on his application and that during such period his "experiment"
will be "watched" by the Board.2 9 It is believed that the Board could
fulfill its responsibility to be of service to the public and to investors if
it would announce in advance its conditions for extending approval
of temporary local service.
The Board also allows a six-month period for getting feeder opera-
tions under way before the three years period begins.3 0 This too could
be announced by a general statement instead of stating the principle
from time to time in Board decisions. This period may be further
extended upon "appropriate showing" (not otherwise defined) to
27 6 C.A.B. 1049, 1061.
28 Rocky Mountain States Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 695 (1946).
29 Texas Oklahoma Case, 7 C.A.B. 481 at p. 528.
30 New England Case, 7 C.A.B. 27.
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the Board that new equipment is not yet ready. This is still another
rule that is buried in decisions.
In two early cases the Board stated its opinion that
"the legal restrictions contained in See. 408(b) of the Act prohibit
as a matter of law the entrance of a surface carrier into air trans-
portation . . . unless such authorization would promote the public
interest by enabling the surface carrier to use aircraft to public
advantage in its operation." 31
This would appear to be a flat rule of interpretation regarding a
statutory standard which guides the Board in determining whether
public convenience and necessity require the issuance of a certificate
under Sec. 401 (d) (1) of the Act. The rule was made final in Ameri-
can President Lines et al., Petition.3 2 A general announcement of this
principle by interpretative regulation would forewarn the industry in
this regard.
These cases, as well as others which could be cited, indicate that
the Board's procedure occasionally has unfortunate results. For lack
of published principles, air carriers are forced to hazard their own
guesses as to what would constitute acceptable performance and the
ultimate results can be inimical not only to the carriers but to the
public interest. The intrinsic construction of the Act argues for co-
herent economic regulations closely derived from specific authoriza-
tions. The practical effects of proceeding without such a set of regula-
tions evidence the necessary shortcomings of an alternative course.
A need for more regulations in certain areas is consistent with a
need for more strict observance of the authority to promulgate differ-
ing types of regulations. Once an authority clearly has been shown to
legislate by regulation, the authority can be exercised with thorough-
ness and detail as to the required conduct. Once a need has been
shown for an interpretation of the Act by the establishment of policy
and guiding principles, they can be stated by further regulation. It
is therefore suggested that the potentialities for more regulation
through the Economic Regulations could be exploited with benefit
to the industry through a more coniplete understanding of what con-
duct the Board expects and advance statement of what policies and
interpretation the Board expects to follow in the future administra-
tion of the Act.
31 American Export Lines, Control-American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619
(1942).
32 7 C.A.B. 799, March 19, 1947.
